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I.

INTRODUCTION

Someday soon, surely much sooner than most people who filled
out their Censusforms last week realize, white Americans will
become a minority group. Long before that day arrives, the
presumption that the "typical" U.S. citizen is someone who
traces his or her descent in a direct line to Europe will be part
of the past.'
The above quote is from a TIME Magazine article from April 9, 1990.2
The cover of the issue-complete with a stylized flag replacing Old Glory's

*
Assistant Professor, North Carolina Central University. I would like to thank my research
assistant, Jassmin McIver-Jones, for her wonderful assistance.

I

William A. Henry, Beyond the Melting Pot, TIME MAG., Apr. 9, 1990, available at

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969770,00.html.
2

Id.
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white stripes with black, brown, and yellow ones-asked, "What will the U.S.
be like when whites are no longer the majority?" 3 The article predicted that by
the year 2056, "the 'average' U.S. resident, as defined by Census statistics, will
trace his or her descent to Africa, Asia, the Hispanic world, the Pacific Islands,
4
Arabia-almost anywhere but white Europe.",
The prognostication featured in that 1990 TIME Magazine article, like
most predictions, has proven to be both accurate and flawed. The article's
assertion that at some point in the mid-21st century, the United States will
become a "majority-minority" nation has not changed. What has changed is the
time frame. Depending upon the source consulted, the United States will
achieve majority-minority status in either 2050 or 2043. 5 Either way, the
"browning of America" is occurring much faster than predicted. In theory,
America is a "melting pot" 6-a place where many different types of people
come together in a m6lange of cultures and languages, happily learning from
one another. But melting pot theory, even to the extent it holds true, overlooks
the fact that people of color-immigrant or otherwise-have often been legally
excluded from full participation in American society. The tension between the
mythologized America where everyone gets along despite racial differences
and the reality that de jure segregation has only recently ended in this country
begs the question: How will the law respond to the browning of America?
Phrased differently, What, if any, legal changes will this demographic change
portend? The focus of this particular Article is the potential impact these
demographics will have on the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
and the way racial advocates should advocate for racial change.
The Author asserts an argument in two parts. The first part of the
argument asserts that the browning of America will impact the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence. First, recent Supreme Court cases on
race indicate that the Court will be hostile to continued strict scrutiny for
3

Id.

4

Id.
See infra Part I.
See generally J.

5
6

HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER

(1793).
[W]hence came all these people? They are a mixture of English, Scotch,
Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes .... What then is the American,
this new man? He is either an European or the descendant of an European,
hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country.
I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman,
whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose
present four sons have now four wives of different nations. He is an
American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners,
receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds.... The Americans were
once scattered all over Europe; here they are incorporated into one of the
finest systems of population which has ever appeared[.]
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African Americans. When evaluating whether a group should be granted strict
scrutiny review, the Court considers the discreteness and insularity of the class,
whether the group has suffered a long history of discrimination, whether the
interests of the group can or have been adequately protected through the
political process, whether the trait is immutable, and whether the group's
defining traits are relevant to the ability to contribute to society. 7 However,
recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the Court may no longer
interpret these factors in a way that favors African Americans. In other words,
as the browning of America continues, the time where litigators can rely on the
Supreme Court to automatically use the UnitedStates v. CaroleneProducts Co.
factors in a manner that results in the application of strict scrutiny for African
Americans will draw to an end.
The second part of the argument asserts that, as the Supreme Court
Equal Protection suggests, racial justice advocates must seek new avenues of
redress. This Article argues that rather than continue to travel the increasingly
narrowed road of the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights advocates should
look to the Commerce Clause. While the Court has effortlessly ignored the
racial complaints of non-whites under the Fourteenth Amendment, the effects
of racism on the national economy cannot be overlooked so easily. Building
upon Professor Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory, the Article asserts
that when the non-white majority comes, the best course of action will be to
convince whites that racism is against the nation's economic interests.
Congress's ability to regulate these concerns under the commerce clause will
then be discussed.
While the topic of this paper is not new, this writing's approach to the
problem is. This writing is certainly not the first to explore the Court's apparent
shift to a more conservative approach to racial issues. Nor is it the first to
consider the Court's various interpretations of the Carolene standard. Most of
the authors that have addressed this issue have considered ways to change the
Court's approach to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence.
However, this Article is the first to present two nuances.
First, this writing is novel because it is the first to consider the
possibility that the Court could do away with strict scrutiny analysis where race
is concerned. Many prior writinvs have considered Carolene analysis or
suggested changes to the doctrine. However, this is the first to consider that
7

See Marcy Strauss, ReevaluatingSuspect Classifications,35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 135, 138-

39(2011).
8
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 716
(1985) (arguing that Carolene is wrong because "the Carolene footnote suggests that, even in a
world in which blacks voted no less frequently than whites, and inwhich election districts strictly
conformed to the Court's reapportionment decisions, blacks would still possess, by virtue of their
discreteness and insularity, a disproportionately small share of influence on legislative policy-a
disproportion of such magnitude as to warrant the judicial conclusion that a fair democratic
process would have generated outcomes systematically more favorable to minority interests");
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the Court might change direction completely on the Carolenefactors when race
is involved.
Second, while many writers have acknowledged the Court's rightward
drift on race, the solution here is different in scope and design. In a seminal
article, Professor Neil Gotanda argued that the Court's "color-blind
constitutionalism" was a flawed approach to racial equality and that "strict
scrutiny should not be abandoned altogether, given its efficacy as a weapon
against segregation in years past." 9 Rather, Gotanda argued that the Court's
application of the doctrine should change. In particular, Professor Gotanda
argued that the Court should consider race explicitly, engage in a discussion of
white privilege, and address the subordination of non-whites.10 This approach
is emblematic of anti-subordination analysis, which, rather than ignoring
history, is careful to examine it.11 "For example, people of African descent in
the United States are classified by their racial identity ('Black') and are
disadvantaged by this group status. Anti-subordination principles urge equal
12
protection doctrine to focus on the very groups whose statuses are harmed."
This approach is seen in many of the articles that followed. Professor
Darren Hutchinson has written that under his "inversion thesis," the Court is no
longer the protector of vulnerable classes, and that the Court's application of
anti-subordination principles can cure this defect. 13 Professors Eric Yamamoto,
Carly Minner, and Karen Winter advocate a "contextual strict scrutiny" that
takes "racial group history and current racial conditions into account, as they
relate to the specific classification."' 14 Professors Mario Barnes, Erwin
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal
Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (arguing that "political powerlessness is
neither necessary nor sufficient for a classification to meet the Court's requirement for
heightened scrutiny" and that "as a normative matter, political powerlessness ought not play a
critical role in equal protection doctrine"); Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of UnderclassReview,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1991) ("'Underclass review' is an elaboration, within the terms of
Ely's representation-reinforcement theory, of Justice Blackmun's suggestion in his concurrence
in Plyler v. Doe that a statute which has the effect of creating a 'discrete underclass' is
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause and warrants heightened scrutiny even though no
fundamental right or suspect classification is involved."); Strauss, supra note 7, at 139-40
(discussing the lack of clarity in the Court's application of the suspect classification factors).
9
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62-63
(1991).
10
See id. at 63-64.
11 See Abigail Nurse, Anti-Subordination in the Equal Protection Clause: A Case Study, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 300 (2014) (noting that group history that includes discrimination or
subordination is relevant to equal protection analysis).
12
See id. at 301.
13

Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race ": The Inversion

of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615,
618-19.
14
Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 How. L.J. 241, 244 (2006).
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Chemerinsky, and Trina Jones also advocate for the rejection of colorblindness. 15 Toward the end of the article, the authors state,
If, for the ... reasons set forth... post-racialism puts into
question this fundamental assumption [that racism continues to
be a problem in the United States], then what is the way
forward for advocates of racial equality? We suggest that
progressives might do well to ... recognize that discrimination
and equal protection are susceptible to varying interpretations
depending upon time and place.16
The last sentence is key. The authors stated that "discrimination and
equal protection are susceptible to varying interpretations depending upon time
and place." This writing disagrees.
When it comes to race, one could argue that the Court is actually not
susceptible to varying interpretations. Rather, one could argue that when it
comes to race, the Court has been remarkably consistent. Certainly, the Court
no longer explicitly implements the Dred Scott directive that a black man has
no rights that a white man is bound to protect,' 7 and has also abandoned the
formal segregation endorsed in Plessy v. Ferguson.18 Nonetheless, the Court
has, for the most part, retained the racial status quo that protects white
privilege. Professor Girardeau Spann explained the problem as such:
Minorities have not only secured significant concessions from
the representative branches, but the representative branches
have typically done more than the Supreme Court to advance
minority interests. In fact, the Supreme Court's civil rights
performance has historically been so disappointing that it lends
little, if any, support to the traditional model of judicial review.
Rather, the Court's decisions serve more as a refutation than a
validation of countermajoritarian judicial capacity. 19
Put another way, while there have been a few moments where the Court helped
to usher forth racial change, those times represent the exceptions rather than the
rule.
So, again, the first part of the argument asserts that the browning of
America will impact the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Part I
of this Article also provides a brief overview of equal protection jurisprudence
and a summary of how the browning of America could impact this
15
16

Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?,98 GEO. L.J. 967, 998 (2010).
Id. at 999.

17 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutionalamendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19 Girardeau A. Spann, PurePolitics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 2000-01 (1990).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10
1136

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

jurisprudence. The second part of the argument encourages civil rights
advocates to look to the Commerce Clause as an alternative means of
addressing racial justice. Part II will explain why the Commerce Clause is a
better alternative for racial justice than the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

This section of the Article will focus on the law as it is, and the law as
it could be in 2050. First, Part II.A will provide an overview of the Court's
current methodology for classifying groups. Second, Part II.B will discuss the
Court's current statements with respect to classification. Finally, Part II.C will
address the changes that may occur in equal protection jurisprudence due to the
browning of America.
A. How the Court Classifies Groups
Equal protection analysis operates, in part, by categorizing groups.
When a state actor discriminates against a group that merits a low level of
protection, that regulation is constitutional as long as the regulation meets
rational basis review.2 ° To be unconstitutional, the plaintiff must prove that
there is no legitimate reason for the differential treatment of the group and that
the regulation bears no rational relationship to the state's purposes.21
Classifications that trigger intermediate scrutiny require a showing on the part
of the state actor that the law is substantially related to an important state
interest.22 Finally, classifications that generate the highest level of reviewstrict scrutiny-are valid only if the state can
demonstrate that the law is
23
interest.
state
compelling
a
to
tailored
narrowly
As demonstrated above, as the level of scrutiny increases, the level of
proof required to justify singling out a particular group, as well as the fit that
must be shown between the regulation and the stated goal becomes more
onerous. Therefore, the level of scrutiny matters. Because the level of scrutiny
matters, the process the Court uses to determine which groups are entitled to
which level of scrutiny also matters. Beginning in Carolene,24 the Court stated
that although rational basis review was appropriate for economic legislation,25

20

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961).

21

Id. at 425.

22

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

23
24

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

25 See id. at 152 ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed, it

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss3/10

6

Smith: Moving from Carolene to the Commerce Clause: A New Approach to Ra

20151

A NEWAPPROACH TO RACE

1137

such review might not be appropriate where "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities" had operated "seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. '26 Under
those circumstances, the Court noted that "a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry" could be required.27 While Carolene was the beginning of the
Court's process, in later cases, the Court added to its analysis by considering
whether the class at issue had "the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is
not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
28
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
The Court has also evaluated whether the classification is one that is relevant,
or more precisely, if the group possesses real differences that necessitate
protection or special treatment.29
In sum, then, when evaluating whether a group should be granted strict
scrutiny review, the Court considers the discreteness and insularity of the class,
whether the group has suffered a long history of discrimination, whether the
interests of the group can or have been adequately protected through the
political process, whether the trait is immutable, and whether the group's
defining traits are relevant to the ability to contribute to society. 30
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to define the terms used above.
This may be somewhat difficult, as the federal courts have not always been
consistent with the definition of terms. However, legal scholarship has
attempted to fill in these gaps. 3' Scholars have defined groups as being discrete
"if they are visible in a way that makes them 'relatively easy for others to
identify.' A group is insular if they tend to interact with each other with 'great
frequency in a variety of social contexts.' ' 32 The history factor is generally
evaluated through analogy. "Because of the lack of precise guidance in
determining whether a group has the requisite history of discrimination, courts
often decide discriminatory history by comparing the experience of the group
to that of African-Americans or women., 33 Immutability has similarly defied
precise definition. In general, though courts
may differ, "immutability depends
34
on whether the trait is easily changed.,
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rationalbasis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators." (emphasis added)).
26
27

Id. at 152 n.4.
Id.

29

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985).

30

Strauss, supra note 7, at 138-39.

31

See generally id.
See id at 149 (quoting Ackerman, supra note 8, at 726-29).

28

32

33
34

See id. at 151.
See id. at 162.
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The political powerlessness prong is likely the one that has proven
most difficult to define. According to Professor Strauss, despite the difficulty,
[j]udges and scholars have suggested four possible approaches,
used either separately or in combination, to assess power.
These approaches consider (1) the group's ability to vote; (2)
the pure numbers of the group; (3) the existence of favorable
legislative enactments that might demonstrate political power;
and (4) whether members of the group have achieved positions
of power and authority."
B. The CurrentCourt's Statements Regarding the Carolene Factors
The Court's recent jurisprudence has given new interpretation to the
Carolene factors. While the Court has not had much to say about immutability,
the Court-or its justices-have had much to say about history, political
powerlessness, discreteness, and insularity. In three primary cases, the Court or
its justices have interpreted these factors in a narrow fashion. The primary
cases are Croson, Shelby County, and Schuette. The cases and their impacts
will be explained chronologically below.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson, Co., the Court applied strict
scrutiny to preferences that benefited African Americans for the first time."
Part of Justice O'Connor's reasoning for this change was that the majority of
the Richmond City Council was African American. She stated, in part, "Five of
the nine seats on the city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political
majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not
against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case., 3 7 The
effect-even if not the intent-was to punish African Americans for their
increased political clout on the Richmond City Council.38 The higher standard
was applied, apparently, only because of this political majority. The clear
implication is that the presence of the political majority of African Americans
changes the calculus that is used to evaluate the problem.
The Court has also recently undermined the history part of the
Carolene analysis. In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,39 Chief Justice John
Roberts acknowledged:
35
36

See id. at 154.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).

37

Id. at 495-96.

38

See Heather K. Gerken, The Foreword:Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv.

4, 50 (2010) ("In Croson, the Court relied on the great John Hart Ely to hold that a minority setaside program was more constitutionally suspect because it had been enacted by a black-majority
city council.").
39 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013).
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It was in the South that slavery was upheld by law until
uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow denied
African-Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state and
local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise citizens
on the basis of race. The Court invoked that history-rightly
so-in sustaining the disparate coverage of the Voting Rights
Act in 1966.40
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts gives a nod to the history of racialized barriers to
voting. But the recognition of history ends there. Chief Justice Roberts
continues to state:
But history did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was
reauthorized in 2006, there had been 40 more years of it. In
assessing the "current need[]" for a preclearance system that
treats States differently from one another today, that history
cannot be ignored. During that time, largely because of the
Voting Rights Act, voting tests were abolished, disparities in
voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and
African-Americans attained political office in record numbers.
And yet the coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in
2006 ignores these developments, keeping the focus on
decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than
current data reflecting current needs.4'
Rather than acknowledge that the overtly racialized barriers to voting have
simply morphed into different "second-generation" barriers (a reality
acknowledged by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent),42 Chief Justice Roberts
implied that the history was irrelevant. It happened, of course, but it has no
relevance to current events or outcomes. By ignoring the history, Chief Justice
Roberts strongly indicated that the Court will be hostile in the future to claims
of the persistence of societal racism. Put another way, the Court feels that the
nation is far enough removed from its overtly racist past to make that past a
mere footnote to current racial concerns.
Finally, the Court-or at least some of its membership-has begun to
signal hostility to the "discreteness" and "insularity" portion of the Carolene
analysis. In Schuette v. BAMN, the Court considered a ballot initiative that
banned affirmative action in the state of Michigan. 43 The Court held that the

40

Id. at 2628.

41

Id. at 2628-29.

42

See id. at 2629.
43
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Intregation & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014).
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initiative did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment." In a concurrence joined
by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote:
The dissent trots out the old saw, derived from dictum in a
footnote, that legislation motivated by "'prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities'
merits "'more exacting
judicial scrutiny."' . . . The dissent does not argue, of course,
that such "prejudice" produced § 26. Nor does it explain why
certain racial minorities in Michigan qualify as "'insular,"'
meaning that "other groups will not form coalitions with
them-and, critically, not because of lack of common interests
but because of 'prejudice."' Nor does it even make the case
that a group's "discreteness" and "insularity" are political
liabilities rather than political strengths-a serious
question ....
In a footnote accompanying the above quote, Justice Scalia cited a law review
article by Professor Bruce Ackerman. In the article, Ackerman states, "Other
things being equal, 'discreteness and insularity' will normally be a source of
enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in
pluralist American politics. '46 In short, Justice Scalia would have the Court
treat the discreteness and insularity of a group as a net positive, rather than a
negative as the writers of Carolene intended.4 7
In sum, the Court appears to be willing to ignore or revise three of the
key Carolene factors-history, discreteness, and political powerlessness-that
it has used to establish strict scrutiny analysis. Thus, nothing other than stare
decisis could reasonably keep the Court from changing its approach to these
matters. The browning of America will likely speed up the process that the
Court has already begun.

See id. at 1638.
Id. at 1644-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
46
Id. at 1645 n.8.
44
45

While it is sometimes assumed that discreteness and insularity are a negative, this is not
always the case. As Cass Sunstein has stated,
[There is a] concern that certain groups are effectively "fenced out" of the
pluralist process because they are unable to participate in political
bargaining. Sometimes this disability is attributed to the "discreteness and
insularity" of the excluded groups. The attribution is questionable, for
discreteness and insularity may increase ratherthan impair the opportunities
for the exercise of political power.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (1985)
(emphasis added).
47
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C. How the Browning ofAmerica Will Impact the Court's Equal
ProtectionJurisprudence
As an introduction to this section, a brief explanation of how the
factors have traditionally operated will be provided using Korematsu v. United
States.48 Assuming Korematsu was decided using the Court's current factors
but the history and facts available in 1944, the decision would be an easy one.
The Court could easily find that race is an unchanging, or difficult to change,
characteristic and thus immutable. In addition, the history of discrimination and
maltreatment would be evident, as the laws in effect at the time would have
been evidence of unequal treatment. Most important are the two final factors.
At the time, because of de jure segregation in the South and de facto (and
sometimes de jure) segregation in the North, most non-whites lived in separate
areas, and were therefore discrete and insular.4 9 Moreover, there were very few
people of color in the United States Congress in the pre-World War II era . 50 For
all of these reasons, on the 1940s record, the Court would have little difficulty
finding that non-whites should be treated as a separate class deserving of strict
scrutiny. However, in light of the Court decisions discussed in Subsection B as
well as political and demographic shifts, it is unlikely that the current Courtor even a future one-would reach a similar conclusion for two reasons.
First, non-whites now have more political clout. The 1960s brought
forth major pieces of legislation to protect people of color, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 5' the Voting Rights Act of 1965,52 and the Fair Housing
Act of 1968. 53 Moreover, African Americans and Latinos now have increased
influence in the electoral process. 54 While the prime example of the newfound
political power is likely embodied in the election of President Barack Obama as

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
For further exploration of this topic, see Douglas Massey, Residential Racial Segregation
and Neighborhood Conditions in US Metropolitan Areas, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL
TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 391 (2001), available at http://www.asu.edu/courses/aph294/
total-readings/massey%20--%20residentialsegregation.pdf. In discussing the work of earlier
demographers, Massey notes that blacks and whites were "distinctly segregated" in the early 20th
century. See id. at 392.
50
The official website of the U.S. House of Representatives indicates that in the 80-year
period between 1869 and 1949, only 24 African Americans served in the House. See Black
Americans in Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http:/Ihistory.house.gov/People/
Search?filter-l (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
51
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000(a) (West 2014)).
52
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
53
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3609-3619 (2015).
54
For a further discussion, see infra Part II.
48
49
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the first African American president, 55 African Americans have made gains in
electoral offices at many levels. 56 While there were less than 1,500 African
American elected officials in 1970, by 1998, that number had increased to
8,830. 57 In contrast to the Korematsu era, it is clear that people of color have
gained access to political office. Moreover,
many of the barriers to voting that
58
existed in the 1940s have been removed.
Second, in addition to the changes in political participation, many are
convinced that America's history of racial apartheid is no longer relevant.
Ironically, this historical reluctance is based, in part, on civil rights
advancements listed above. Many persons believe that because African
Americans have made extraordinary social progress in the past 60 years, racism
is a thing of the past. Indeed, professor, author, and social commentator Shelby
Steele, a noted black conservative,5 9 wrote in 2008:
Obama's post-racial idealism told whites the one thing they
most wanted to hear: America had essentially contained the
evil of racism to the point at which it was no longer a serious
barrier to black advancement.... Of course, it is true that
white America has made great progress in curbing racism over
the last 40 years. It is exactly because America has made such
dramatic racial progress that whites today chafe so under the
racist stigma.60
The import of Steele's words is a cruel irony. The more racial progress that is
made, the more likely whites (and other Americans) are to feel that the history
of racial discrimination is just that-history. For these persons, America's
racial past is in the past, and any failure of upward mobility on the part of
African Americans or other groups of color is a fault of character-not
structural racism.
In light of these new facts, this writing predicts that the Supreme Court
will, in the near future, change or alter its strict scrutiny jurisprudence.
Although the Court will continue to recognize race as an immutable
characteristic and will continue to recognize its relevance, the Court will seize

55
President Barack Obama, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/
president-obama (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
56
See Black Elected Officials by Office, and by Region and State, ALLCOUNTIES.ORG,
http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/473 blackelectedofficials-by-office-and.html
(last
visited Mar. 12, 2015).
57 Id.
58
See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
59
Shelby Steele, HOOVER INST., http://www.hoover.org/profiles/shelby-steele (last visited
Mar. 12, 2015).
60
Shelby Steele, Obama's Post Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oe-steele5-2008nov05-story.html#page= 1.
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upon the gains of the past 60 years to argue: (1) African Americans are no
longer politically powerless and (2) the history of legal subjugation that African
Americans have endured is no longer present. With these arguments at the fore,
the Court will eventually conclude that there is no longer a need to apply strict
scrutiny to laws that discriminate against African Americans and other racial
minorities.
Iii.AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The previous section outlined why race-based cases brought under the
Equal Protection Clause will prove difficult to win in the future. In light of this
reality, advocates for racial justice should look for new remedies. This Article
proposes that the Commerce Clause could be a very viable option. Subsection
A, below, will briefly explain the workings of the Commerce Clause. Then,
Subsection B will discuss why the Commerce Clause could be an attractive
option.
A.

The Commerce Clause

In 1995, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez
ushered in a new era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.6 1 In Lopez, the Court
acknowledged that Congress may regulate four broad categories using the
Commerce power: the channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, persons and things in interstate commerce, and "those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 62
In order to determine whether the final category should be applied in
any given case, the Court considers four factors. First, the activity at issue
should be economic.63 The Court has defined "economic" as "the consumption,
production, or distribution" of goods or services. 64 Second, the Court will
attempt to locate a reference to interstate commerce-or a "jurisdictional hook"
-in the statute.65 Third, the Court examines the record for any findings made
by Congress attempting to explain the link between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce.66 Finally, the Court will evaluate the link between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce to ensure that the link is not too
attenuated.67
61

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

62

Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).

63

See id. at 559-60.

64
65

Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.

66

See id. at 562-63.

67

See id. at 567.
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B. Why the Commerce Clause is an Attractive Option for RacialJustice
The Commerce Clause could be an effective tool for racial justice for at
least three reasons, which will be explained below. First, the doctrine itself is
nominally race neutral. Second, past practice indicates that the Commerce
Clause can be successfully used to further racial justice-it has simply been
underutilized. Finally, the issue of "interest convergence" will be explored.
Each of these will be examined in turn.
1. The Racial Neutrality of the Commerce Clause
From the "three-fifths" clause68 to Dred Scott v. Sandford,6 9 the early
days of American Constitutional jurisprudence-and indeed, the Constitution
itself-made clear that the races in America were not regarded equally in the
eyes of the law. The Reconstruction Amendments attempted to correct this
Original American Sin by freeing the slaves, granting formerly enslaved men
the right to vote, and extending American citizenship to the newly freed
slaves. 70 In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court interpreted the newly minted Equal
Protection Clause in a narrow manner, leading to the implementation of "Jim
Crow" segregation laws across much of the southern United States. 7 1 The
doctrine of "separate but equal" would persist until it was declared
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education.72
The point of the foregoing paragraph is to illustrate that the "narrative,"
so to speak, of Equal Protection jurisprudence, is a narrative of the struggle of
African Americans and other racial minorities to seek legal redress. In other
words, the entire history of the Equal Protection Clause is racialized. From
Homer Plessy to Linda Brown to the plaintiffs in numerous other cases, the
story of Equal Protection is the story of race in America. To be certain, the
Equal Protection Clause extends to all persons in the country and is not limited
to racial claims. However, any plaintiff of color bringing a suit under the Equal
Protection Clause must recognize the history that is being invoked when the
Equal Protection Clause is employed.
In stark contrast, the narrative of the Commerce Clause is quite
different. The Commerce Clause has undergone at least four eras of change.73
Early in the nation's history, the Court adopted an expansive view of the

69

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
60 U.S. 393 (1857), supersededby constitutionalamendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

70

See U.S. CONST. amend. XII, amend. XIV, amend XV.

71
72

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

73

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 247-48
(4th

68

ed. 2011).
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clause. 4 During the Industrial Revolution, the Court changed course and took a
narrower position. 7 5 In its third era, the Court again adopted an expansive
view.76 The Court's current Commerce Clause jurisprudence has narrowed the
doctrine a bit. In both Lopez and National Federation of Independent

Businesses v. Sebelius, for example, the Court held that Congress had exceeded
its power under the Commerce Clause. 77
If the jurisprudence regarding both the Commerce Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause has evolved, one might wonder why either has an
advantage. The advantage lies in the fact that although the changes in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence have been largely tied to major shifts in the
American economy, Equal Protection jurisprudence has fluctuated based on not
only the individual justices on the Court, but also the commitment of the nation
at a particular time to racial advancement.
For example, it has been argued that although the Warren Court was
able to make great strides in moving the country towards racial equality, its
successors have not taken the same approach. 8 One could argue that this is due
to the hostility of the successor justices as individuals. 79 One could also argue
that the Warren Court was merely reacting to the majority of Americans who
wanted to change the racial status quo. 80 Further still, one could argue that as
74
75
76

See id. at 251.
See id. at 252.

See id. at 261.

77 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
78

See Lord Woolf, The InternationalImpact of the Warran Court, in

THE WARREN COURT: A

366, 368 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1996) ("Hence, as the successor court to the
Warren Court was, in the view of some observers, going into reverse, English law was firmly
embracing the pure Warren approach to gender and race equality."). See generally Rogers M.
Smith, Black and White after Brown: Constructions of Race in Modern Supreme Court
Decisions, 5 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 709, 715 (2003) ("But in the last two decades, other judges have
explicitly criticized the aspects of Warren's opinion [in Brown v. Board of Education] that most
clearly express this conception, none more frequently or influentially than Marshall's successor,
Justice Clarence Thomas.").
79 See Spann, supra note 19, at 2011 ("Hence, regardless of the particular political
preferences that individual justices may have, the Supreme Court as an institution will be
receptive to legal arguments advancing political positions that have the support of durable rather
than transitory majorities. The ultimate effect of this selective sensitivity is to render the Court a
force for preservation of the political status quo. Proponents of political change will be less
successful before the Court than will their opponents.").
80
Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV.
1537, 1541 (2004) ("The Court did relatively little to enforce Brown until the legislative
deadlock over civil rights was broken with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
President Lyndon B. Johnson's landslide election in the same year. Thus, the Court generally
worked with national majorities rather than against them. It did not take the lead so much as work
in tandem with political forces that had been growing in strength and influence for some time. It
was countermajoritarian primarily with respect to those states that resisted a growing national
RETROSPECTIVE
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de jure segregation ended, it freed up the Court to declare-merely 25 years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-that programs intended to
target the racist practices of the past were unconstitutional. 8' Put simply, once
de jure segregation ended, the impetus--of the Court, its justices, and indeed
many Americans-to seek racial justice faded.
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the history of the Commerce
Clause is not steeped in racial drama. Indeed, the most noted Commerce Clause
cases-Gibbons v. Ogden,82 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,8 3 United States v. E.C.
Knight,84 NLRB v. Jones Laughlin,85 United States v. Lopez, 86 United States v.
Morrison8 7-have no racial component at all. The question must be askedWhy does this matter?
As the Court becomes hostile to race based claims, invoking a portion
of the Constitution that explicitly requires the Court to consider race could
result in an unfavorable outcome. Put another way, why place race front and
center when the reaction of the majority of the Court to such a claim would
range from ambivalence to outright hostility? To be certain, under any claim, a
justice could, if she wanted, view the facts through a particular lens that favors
a particular outcome. 88 The argument proffered in this writing is not that such
engineering would never happen, but rather that such engineering would be
more difficult under the Commerce Clause than the Equal Protection Clause
where race is involved.
2. HeartofAtlanta and Katzenbach v. McClung-What Is Past Is
Prologue?
In 1964, due to pressure placed by the burgeoning Civil Rights
Movement, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act"). 89 The
Act prohibited establishments designated as public accommodations from
trend, and it became most insistent precisely at the moment when civil rights became a national
legislative policy. Throughout, the Supreme Court supported national values at the expense of
regional values.").
81 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 448 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
(noting the irony of the Court's decision in light of the fact that the plaintiffs had lived in
Richmond, Virginia, formerly the capital of the Confederate States of America).
82
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
83
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
84

156 U.S. I (1895).

85

301 U.S. 1 (1937).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).

86

529 U.S. 598 (2000).
On this note, see, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
This writing is considered one of the leading publications on legal realism.
89
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
87
88

U.S.C.A. § 2000(a) (West 2014)).
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engaging in racial discrimination in the provision of goods or services. 90 The
Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in two cases.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the plaintiff hotel alleged
that the Act exceeded Congress's Commerce authority. 9' The Court rejected
their claims.9 2 The plaintiff asserted that Congress lacked the authority to use
the Commerce Power to address the social ill of racism. 93 The Court roundly
rejected this claim in the following words:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in
many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In
framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with
what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not
detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive
effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial
intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to
enact appropriate'iegislation, and, given this basis for the
exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact
that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with
which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social
wrong. 94
In a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung,95 the Court reached a
similar conclusion. The plaintiffs restaurant refused to serve African
Americans, although the Act required it to do so, and much of its food travelled
in interstate commerce. 96 The Court rejected the claim, stating that Congress
had "broad and sweeping" Commerce powers and that so long as a de minimis
amount of the goods at the establishment
had crossed state lines, the Commerce
97
Clause had not been violated.
Thus, in not one, but two prior cases invoking both race and commerce,
the Court has indicated that it is commerce that will carry the day. In both
cases, race played no part in the Court's rationale. Moreover, the Court's
statement in Heart of Atlanta that Congress can use the Commerce Clause to
solve racial issues is one that should be used by racial justice advocates. Heart
of Atlanta and McClung demonstrate that the Commerce Clause can be
effectively used to work for racial justice.
90

See id.

91

379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).

92

See id.

93

See id. at 257.
See id. at 257-58.
95 379 U.S. 294 (1964). This case is sometimes colloquially referred to as "Ollie's Barbeque"
after the name of the plaintiffs restaurant.
96
See id. at 295.
94

97 Id. at 305.
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Of course, it is possible that a different nine justices under different
circumstances would decide Heart of Atlanta or McClung differently. In
fairness, that difference in outcome could stem from racial animosity, but could
also stem from a hostility to, say, the expansion of Congress's authority over
interstate activities.9 8 However, it would be far more difficult to invalidate the
law under the Commerce Clause without engaging in a completely tortured
analysis. As previously stated, the Commerce Clause allows for the regulation
of persons and things in interstate commerce. While it is possible that the Court
could revise this statement, it is highly unlikely. Without the ability to regulate
persons and things in interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause would lose
significant functionality. As such, this seems a more solid place to build a
foundation than the quicksand of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, as long as
racial advocates are hoping to regulate persons or things in interstate
commerce, there seems to be hope for laws that address racial issues through an
economic means.
3. Interest Convergence-Next Steps
The theory of interest convergence was first proposed by Professor
Derrick A. Bell. Writing in 1980 about the aftermath of the Brown v. Board of
Education decision, Professor Bell wrote:
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and
after Brown, this principle of "interest convergence" provides:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone,
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial
equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.
It follows that the availability of fourteenth amendment
protection in racial cases may not actually be determined by
the character of harm suffered by blacks or the quantum of
liability proved against whites. Racial remedies may instead be
the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps
subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted,
will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by middle and upper class whites. Racial
justice-or its appearance-may, from time to time, be

98

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (Thomas, J., concurring) (disfavoring any

approach to the Commerce Clause that gives Congress power over "matters that substantially
affect interstate commerce").
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counted among the interests deemed important by the courts
and by society's policymakers. 99
Interest convergence theory suggests that the Commerce Clause would
be a natural fit for advancing racial justice. Take, for example, the issue of
race-conscious admissions programs in colleges and universities. When such an
issue is framed in racial terms, there will always be a "winner" and a "loser."
Whites may feel cheated, while people of color may feel that race neutral
programs fail to consider the race-based challenges many students of color
face. Thus, the parties are naturally antagonistic. This is the stalemate produced
by Equal Protection jurisprudence.
However, if the issue is framed in economic terms, there is more of a
chance of finding common ground. For instance, if the issue is framed as
"African American college graduates save the nation x amount of dollars each
year," interest convergence theory states that more whites, though they may be
nominally disadvantaged by such a policy, would be more open to it because of
the benefit to the city, state, or nation. Of course, there is no guarantee that
whites would respond in this manner. This writing simply asserts that such an
outcome is more likely under a commerce based approach.
The question then becomes-how much does racism cost? In the
absence of the de jure segregation that existed in the 1960s when Heart of
Atlanta and McClung were decided, it seems that some quantifiable measure
would be helpful. At this point, it appears that there are no studies in the social
sciences that attempt to place a dollar figure on how racism impacts daily life.
However, there is one solid number that exists that can be used to create a
syllogism that should demonstrate the workability of commerce-based
approaches to racial justice.
At present, the Nielsen Company estimates that African Americans
have one trillion dollars in buying power. 100 The number is expected to reach
$1.3 trillion by 2017. 101 In addition,
African-Americans make an average of 156 shopping trips per
year, compared with 146 for the total market. Favoring smaller
retail outlets, blacks shop more frequently at drug stores,
convenience stores, and dollar stores. Beauty supply stores are
also popular within the black community, as they typically
carry an abundance of ethnic hair and beauty aids... that cater

99
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma,
93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523-24 (1980).
1oo See African American ConsumersAre More Relevant Than Ever, NIELSEN (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2013/african-american-consumers-are-morerelevant-than-ever.html.
101

See id.
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specifically to the unique needs of African-American hair
textures.102
Using this information, consider the issue of "shopping while black."
Many African Americans allege that due to an irrational fear that African
Americans are more likely to steal items, they are followed around stores.103
Assuming that African Americans are avoiding certain establishments due to
this profiling behavior, their purchases are not made, and their money is
diverted elsewhere. Because the goods at issue have travelled interstate, such as
those in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court should easily be able to regulate
such behavior. (As a bonus, it should be noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot be used to regulate such behavior because
04 the provision does not extend
to the actions of privately owned businesses.)
This may not be the only, or the best, example of the plausibility of
commerce jurisprudence to right racialized wrongs. Moreover, it must be noted
that many manifestations of racism-such as police brutality-lack a patently
obvious economic component. In addition, to the extent that someone could put
a price on certain racial microagressions, such as shopping while black, some
may feel it distasteful to do so. These are all worthy criticisms. However, the
objective of the current writing is simply to outline what could perhaps be a
new-if imperfect-way to approach racial justice issues in the federal courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the heady days following May 17, 1954, advocates for racial
equality surely and justly felt that they won a hard fought victory. However, in
the decades that followed, they surely must have been chagrined by the "one
step forward, two steps back" approach to racial justice adopted by the
Supreme Court. The Court's stubborn unwillingness to recognize the
persistence of racism is not something that can be overcome by simply

102

See id.

103

See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, Shopping While Black, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2013),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shopping-while-black/2013/10/31/5c7129d441a4-1e3-a751-f032898f2dbcstory.htrnl; Teresa Wiltz, "Shopping While Black" Is Still an
Issue-atBarneys andElsewhere, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/oct/28/bameys-racial-profiling-shopping-while-black.
104 Section 1981, passed under the Thirteenth Amendment authority, may seem to be a
possibility. However, that law has a mens rea requirement that need not be imported into
Commerce Clause analysis. See, e.g., Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42
U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 28-29
(2003) ("To state a claim in the making or enforcing of a contract under § 1981, a preponderance
of the evidence must prove that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) defendants
intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination was
directed toward one or more of the activities protected by the statute." (citations omitted)).
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appointing more sympathetic justices. Rather, a change in tactics would be
helpful.
This brief essay is not intended to be a treatise, but the start of a
conversation. There are many things that were not discussed in order to keep
this writing compact. Other things-such as the economic impact of racismwere not discussed because the data do not exist. Despite these gaps, this is a
worthy project. When battling a foe as pernicious and clever as racism, one
must be careful not to become too complacent or reliant on one approach. This
writing hopes to shed light on a new approach to racial issues.
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